Restore a Distributable Naval Air Force by Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2019-04
Restore a Distributable Naval Air Force
Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
Hughes, Wayne. Restore a Distributable Naval Air Force.  U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 2019, p. 24-27
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61951
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
RESTORE · . ..:..~-· 
A DISTRIBUTAB[E 
NAVAL AIR FOR·c~E·· -· 
BY CAPTAIN WAYNE HUGHES, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED) 
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Budget constraints will demand 
a blue-water fleet that is smaller 
but still capable of sea control 
and power projection. Diversi-
fying an<;i distributing the sea-
based air'.force-ir{l)a rt"by·Using 
LHAs-may be the so~ution. 
.......... .,  
""C -, 
~' I . /\ \,\ . }. 
I n June 2018, the U.S. Naval lnstitu te published my art icle , "Build a Green-Water Flee t." The ar-ticle names the types of vesse ls and compu tes 
their costs, emphasiz ing that the fleet must be de-
signed to go in harm's way in dangero us littora l 
waters agai nst a variety of prospective enemies. 
The green-wa ter fleet wou ld take only a frac tion of 
the Navy's shipbuilding budget: because it com-
prises relatively sma ll vesse ls, its 394 ships cou ld 
be had for less than $2 billion in shipbuilding and 
conversion funds per year. By far the most cost ly 
component would be the eight CVLs, small carr i-
ers of 30 aircraft, inc lud ing 20 short takeoff and 
vert ica l landing (STO VL) F-35Bs. They are pr iced 
at $3 billion each. 1 
The June essay also contends that because of 
the cost of building the next generation of nu-
clear-powered ballistic-miss ile submar ines, the 
blue-water fleet w ill have to shr ink, although it 
does not specify in what way.2 To work up a new, 
smaller blue-wate r fleet within a realistic budget is 
a good dea l harder than to describe the much less 
costly fleet des igned to take the offensive to deny 
an enemy his own littora l waters. 
The blue-wa ter flee t is responsible for both sea 
control and powe r proj ect ion, so it is far bigger in 
tonnage and more costly in billets. It is not easy 
to formulate its compos ition for many interre-
lated missions and tasks. A strong first step, how-
ever, is to concentrate on diversifyi ng its most ex-
pensive and manpowe r-intensive component: the 
sea-based air force. Toward that end, the first task 
ought to be to resto re a more distributable nava l 
air force instead of conce ntrat ing so much value in 
IO or 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carr iers (CVNs). 
PAST AS PROLOGUE 
A fleet of large wars hips for sea control and powe r 
project ion was the stable core of the 20th-century 
U.S. Navy. ln rece nt years, awa reness of the need 
for a bigger navy has grown, but most solutions 
have included buy ing more of the same kind of 
warships or chang ing the mix of existi ng designs. 
This is like shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic-
with the CVN as the only deck chai r des ign for 
sea-based air operations. 
In the 20t h century , the Navy employed many 
and var ied aircra ft carriers and supporting land-
based a ircraft . When Rear Adm iral William Mof-
fett was charge d with developin g nava l aviation 
in 192 1, he did not know what size or configura-
tion o f carriers and aircraft types were best suited 
to support the fleet. Moffett also explor ed land -
based aircraft primari ly designed to detect the en-
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emy at long range, includin g seap lanes, amphibian s, 
and dirigibles. 3 
At the end of the 1930s, the Navy had only six carri -
ers of various sizes, but six was enough to become oper-
ationa lly proficient and ready to expand the carrier fleet 
rapidly. During World War II, when it realized the many 
roles naval aviation must play, the Navy built more than 
I 00 carriers of different sizes and configurat ions. After 
the war, for the next 40 years , it employed a variety of 
carriers for many purposes. In 1954, as a junior officer, I 
served in a destroyer that was part of a hunter-killer task 
group centered on an escort carrier flying antisubmarine 
aircraft. Over the years, however, the carriers became so 
Another way to spread capability would be to convert container 
ships to support aircraft. The British experimented with this con-
cept during the Falklands War, converting the Atlantic Conveyor 
(show n here) to bring in heavy-lift VTOL aircraft and fitting the 
Astronomer with a temporar y flight deck and hangar forward to 
carry helicopters . The Astronomer late r was fitted with the Arap-
aho containerized aircraft handling system, a hangar, and a flight 
deck and was commissioned as RFA Reliant. 
much bigger that their number s dwindled , and each one 
had to serve more purposes. 
After the collapse of the Sov iet Un ion in 1991, most 
naval aviat ion energy was devoted to supportin g land 
operations around the wor ld with a sing le design: the 
large and cost ly CVN . The fleet became efficient at pro -
jecting power with sop hist icate d aircraft that flew into 
danger over land, but from a safe sanctuar y at sea. That 
sanctua ry is now lost , yet one CVN has upward of $ 18 
billion in ship and aircraft eggs in its sing le basket. The 
vulnerabilit y of large carrie rs to missi le attacks is a 
grow ing problem, and sea co ntrol is once again a sig-
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nificant-perhaps the most important-miss ion for the 
blue-water navy. 
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
A realignment of our Navy and Marine Corps air com -
ponents into a more distributable force is the first step 
in changing the blue-water fleet, because air superior-
ity is essentia l to execute what has to be a multifaceted 
21st-century strategy. In outline, such a durable 2 I st-cen-
tury strategy must: 
• Fit a national maritime strategy. The United States is 
a maritime nation that must retain sea control before any 










• Recog nize deterrence of nuclear war will . ~ 
be a cost ly role for the Navy. co ntinu e to 
• Emphasize two distinct but comp lemer,t 
a ry capab · 1 · 
ties: (I) sea control of the open oceans wor ldw ide t 1 1-
fend the sea lanes and keep blue water safe fi 11 . 
0 de-
. d (2) or a fnendl nat ions ; an sea denial in confined wat Y . ers where p 
spectrve enemy forces lurk and where th U . ro-
k . . e n1ted Stat must eep comm itments to its allies O . es . . . . r supp ort fnend] 
nation s rn cnt 1ca l regions such as the 8 1 . Y 
M d . a trc , Easte. e rterranean, and China seas. 1 n 
• A long with operat iona l plans and flee t com .. 
· bl ~ . positron be 
su1ta e 1or cooperation competition co ti . ' 
d •ffi ' , n rontatron and 1 . erent leve ls of conflict wi th a ma - . ' 
JOI power. Such a 
strategy, when affordab le, cannot be risk free 
• Recogniz~ conflict ag_ai_nst a major pow e~ must be a 
war of contarnment , avoi d mg escalation and t . . 
· h h . . . erm111at111g 
wit t e_least poss ible violence 111 a negot iated set tleme nt 
that achieves U.S. goa ls for go ing to wa r. A sea- denial 
strategy against China that doe s not threate n the main-
land illustrates a strategy of peace tim e influence and 
wartime containment. A strategy of total victory against 
China wou ld lead to World War HI. 
Hence , a flexibl e, adaptable, and distributable force 
is necessary to achieve the strategy's ways (operat ional 
plans) and means (force compos ition and tactics) and 
meet its severa l national goa ls. 
Two specia l forms of sea control require separate at-
tention. First, recent time- and energy-consuming tasks 
have includ ed counterdrug , antipiracy, and immigr ant 
policing operations. These operations will continue . Sec-
ond, the Navy faces prospe ctive future Arct ic operations 
to guard U.S. commerce or keep Russian Navy unit s at 
bay in summer months. Both kinds of sea control require 
highly distributable air support, some of it sea based. 
SEA-BASED AIR FORCE COMPONENTS 
What entities can make up a more distributable, nu-
merous , and defendable sea-based air force? In the air, 
manned jet aircraft wou ld be supplemented by some mix 
of unmann ed aeria l vehicles (UAVs), unmanned combat 
aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and all forms of vertica l take-
off (VTOL) and STOVL aircraft. On the water, the first 
and easies t way to spread capab ility is to assign LHA-
class amphibious assau lt ships an operational role that 
is s imultan eously experimental. Another quickly achiev-
ab le expedient is the "Ara paho concept": converting 
container ship s to support VTOL aircraft that will par-
ticipate in certain kinds of contingenc ies around the 
world. 4 For a flexible long-term solution , a light carrier 
should be developed similar to a design out lined a de-
cade ago by then-Lieutenan t Frank Weisser and Tinya 
Coles-Ciep ly.5 
From the land, forward detachment s of Marine Corps 
or Army aircraft flying from obscure airfie lds and ac-
compan ied by ready-to-launch antiship cruise missi les 
can team with forces afloat, but they must be trained for 
sea-denial attacks in enemy-held waters. Long-range 
manned Air Force bombers flying from distant airfields 
have more secure bases, and they carry big payloads, but 
they are expensive. Some allies and friendly states can 
contribute air capability in limited ways, and their contri-
butions should be considered. 
A PLAN OF ACTION 
To impro ve U.S. sea-based air capabi lities: 
• First, there must be agreement on the durab le maritime 
strategy's end s. The Chief of Nava l Operations recently 
issue d a statement that goes far toward specifying a strat-
egy that wi ll provide the focus. 6 
• Second, a plan of action must have a sponsor who un-
derstand s the need to broaden the Navy 's naval aviation 
perspective, and under a sense of urgency. 
• Third , the plan should be developed by a small team 
conversant with candidate solut ions led by a representa-
tive of the sponsor. The plan shou ld enumer ate initia l ac-
tionable steps by the sponsor to ach ieve the endpoint. 
• Fourth, the team should have Marine participant s who 
are familiar with the plans to refine futur e Marine Corps 
missions , tasks, and composi tion. 
The outcome shou ld describe a suita ble naval air force 
endpoint, understanding that externa l factors likely wi ll 
change the composition before that endpoint is reached. 
SUMMING UP 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor eliminated battle- · 
ships as the Navy's cap ital ships. Shortly thereafter , the 
loss of land-ba sed bombers (B- l 7s) to air strikes in the 
Philippines eliminated them as a complement to aircraft 
carriers. Then the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of 
Wales by Japane se naval aircraft flying from land was 
conclusive evidence that naval aviation, not the battle-
ship, was going to be the "capital ship" in the Pacific war . 
By the end of 194 1, wi th the exce ption of minecraft , the 
purpose of every combat ship in the Navy had changed. 
Almost from a cold start , the Navy designed and pro-
duced an amphibious navy with nothin g to go on excep t 
Marine Corps prewar thinking. If we suffer a new Pearl 
Harbor in the form of two or more CVNs suddenly being 
put out of action, it will be too late to change the way the 
Navy fights unle ss there is a plan in place. 
The Navy must plan a more distributable sea- based air 
capability to support the United States' role as a maritime 
nation. Something must be done to retain the capabili ty 
for sea control and power projecti on in low- to mid-sized 
contingencies and to be ready to respond to great power 
aggression. To get started , LHAs, UAVs, and STOVLs of-
fer three immediate ways to supplement CVNs. "Steam-
ing-or flying-as before " cannot cont inue indefinitely. 
1. The cost is based on "Operational Employment of a Light Aircraft Carrier" 
written by then-Lieutenant Frank Weisser and n nya Co/es-Ciep/y. Dated Sep-
tember 2009, this unclassified thesis is available electronically through the Naval 
Postgraduate School Knox Library. 
2. The impending commitment to Columbia-class SSBN construction is esti-
mated to be between $5.3 billion and $6.5 billion per year whlle the 15-year 
replacement program is being executed. 
3. A study of the swift evolution of naval aviation that contrasts British and U.S. 
peacetime actions is Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Man-
de/es, American and British Aircraft Development, 1919-1941 (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1999). 
4. Explored many years ago, the Arapaho concept was gold-plated with so 
many supporting containers its costly design was wisely rejected at a time 
when the United States was relatively rich in aircraft carriers. In the Falklands 
War, the British converted merchant ships such as the Atlantic Conveyor to 
bring heavy-lift VTOL aircraft to the South Atlantic. 
5. Weisser and Coles-Ciep/y, "Operational Employment of a Light Aircraft Carrier." 
6. ADM John Richardson, USN, "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 
Version 2.0," December 2018, 9. 
• CAPTAIN HUGHES is a professor of operations research at the Naval Post-
graduate School. He is the author of numerous books and articles on naval 
warfare and tactics, including Fleet Tactics and Naval Op erat ions, 3rd ed. 
(Naval Institute Press. 2018). 
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